Considerable mystery and intrigue still surrounds the whole issue
of terrorism financing. We know more today than we did four years ago,
but there is still so much that we don’t know. Before 9/11 Al Qaeda’s
budget was estimated by the CIA at around $30 – 34 million. We haven’t
the faintest notion now of what al Qaeda and other salafist terrorist
groups need or spend today.
What is clear is that al Qaeda, the Taliban, and those associated with
them still get the money they need. And there is still considerable money
flowing in to support radical Jihad indoctrination, recruitment, and
training.
In the past Al Qaeda relied heavily on sympathetic financial
facilitators and other deep pocket donors to obtain and channel the
funds necessary to meet their logistical and operational requirements.
These facilitators obtained funds from a variety of donors, primarily in the
Gulf countries and particularly in Saudi Arabia. The 9/11 Commission
report led us to believe that al Qaeda, post-9/11, was having a difficult
time raising funds and that it was cutting back significantly on its
expenditures. There are now good reasons to question these
assumptions. The pace of terrorist recruitment and activities has
accelerated, not decreased, and the growth of self sustaining local al
Qaeda cells is also increasing. There are reports also of large sums of
money flowing into the hands of Iraqi insurgents, including Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi.
New training camps are being established in several remote areas in
the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa and several countries of the former
Soviet Union. There are also indications that the pace of funds being
providing to radical fundamentalist teaching centers around the world has
remained constant, or even increased
By some estimates, Saudi Arabia pumped some $75 billion dollars
into fundamentalist – Wahhabi Islam over the last 4 decades. Intended or
not, these funds have also provided the seed money for al Qaeda and
associated jihadi cells around the world. The line from Wahhabism to
Jihadism is a very thin one, and easily crossed religiously and
intellectually. The war in Iraq and the Palestinian conflict with Israel also
serve as additional impetus for funding, recruitment and support for this
new generation of al Qaeda related jihadists.
Al Qaeda’ Financial Facilitators
The 9/11 Commission pointed to a core number of financial
facilitators involved in raising, moving and storing the money al Qaeda.
Several of these financial facilitators have been captured or identified.
They reportedly have provided names and information that have led to the
identification of other facilitators and funding sources. But knowing
their names has not been enough to put them out of business. In fact,
most of al Qaeda’s financial supporters and deep pocket donors continue
to run their business. Saudi financiers, such as Yasin Al Qadi and Wael
Hamza Julaidan, both of whom were very active in raising funds for al
Qaeda, continue to conduct business affairs in Saudi Arabia. Youssef
Nada and Idris Nasreddin, also designated as Al Qaeda financiers by the
US Treasury Department and the United Nations, continue to manipulate
their assets from their headquarters in Campione d’Italia and Rabat,
Morocco. We have had zero success in getting other countries to
prosecute these individuals or even to get them to freeze their assets
other than token bank accounts.
Charities
Al Qaeda’s reliance on charities has also been put under close
scrutiny by counter- intelligence and enforcement agencies around the
world. Many of the charities identified as linked to al Qaeda were
supposed to be closed. In fact, most are still in business. With little or
no action being taken against those who ran these charities, they were
simply able to reopen the charities under new names.
Many of these tainted charities remain associated with the major
Islamic umbrella organizations headquartered in Saudi Arabia, such as the
World Muslim League and the International Islamic Relief Organization
(IIRO), These organizations have branches worldwide and continue to
provide key funding for radical Islamic and jihadi teachings.
It is not uncommon for Islamic charities to run and own their own
businesses. And there is almost no oversight as to how they use these
funds. There is also a nexus between businesses and the charities they
use to mask their terrorism related funding.
Al Qaeda’s Other Fund Sources
We must also continue to factor in the international drug trade
operating out of still uncontrolled areas of Afghanistan as well as in
Pakistan’s northwest territory. Just how much of this may still reach al-Qaeda is uncertain. Some experts believe that al Qaeda’s reliance on drug
money has increased as it has looked to alternative sources of financing.
Mirwais Yasini, the head of Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics
Directorate, maintains that there is still a “central linkage” between many
of the drug traffickers, Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden. Drug funds
are also reported key to funding al Qaeda operations in areas of the
former Soviet Union, including Chechnya.
Al Qaeda Banking
From the beginning Al Qaeda made use of the international banking
community to conduct many of its financial activities. Since 9/11, banks
have increased their vigilance concerning possible terrorist funding
activities. Freezing orders have been placed against funds identified as
belonging to al Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as those associated with
them. Yet, there is still reason to believe that well heeled financiers, and
established charities and businesses with links to al Qaeda, continue to
use international banking facilities as well as hawala channels. Many
hawalars are well connected with banks in Asia and the Middle East. Their
transfer accounts raise few questions and are employed for settlement
between hawalars, hiding completely the transactions originator and
ultimate receiver.
Government responses
The fight against terrorism financing has benefited significantly
from increased intelligence. This has included information gleaned from
forensic banking investigations, from suspicious transaction reports,
from seized computers and documents and from information obtained
from captured al-Qaeda operatives or associates.
Steps were taken in a number of countries to designate individuals
and entities, including charities, believed implicated in al Qaeda and
associated terrorism financing. Many of these designations were
submitted to the UN Security Council for addition to the UN consolidated
list of al Qaeda and Taliban associated individuals and entities.
The Security Council also passed a series of resolutions imposing
on all countries the obligation to freeze the assets of such individuals and
entities and to prevent their nationals from providing them any economic
resources.
But, these measures have been too narrowly applied. First of all they
pertain only to those 400+ individuals and entities on the UN list. And,
beyond that, few countries have acted to freeze assets other than bank
accounts. To date some $150 million has been reported frozen. Many
governments also put in place new regulations after 9/11 to tighten
banking oversight. These included new “know your customer”
requirements . Still, even with these new rules looking for terrorism
related transactions is like looking for the proverbial needle in the
haystack.
Most countries have failed to take any action against tangible
assets supporting terrorism, including businesses and other income
producing assets. In fact, most countries admit that they lack the
authority or ability to block such assets. There is also the additional
problem of businesses and assets which are owned and administered
jointly with non-designated persons. This may include family members.
International Cooperation in the War on Terrorism Financing
Current International cooperation against terrorism financing is
founded largely on a series of International obligations, regional
agreements, and bilateral arrangements. UN Security Council Resolutions
1373 (2001), 1526 (2004) and 1617 (2005) provide important pillars for
this cooperation.
1373 directs that all countries afford one another the “greatest
measure of assistance” in tracing down terrorists and investigating
terrorist acts. It also calls on all countries to “find ways of intensifying
and accelerating the exchange of operational information.” It also
established a special Counter Terrorism Committee charged with
enhancing international efforts to deal with terrorism. But it has not yet
provided an effective platform for cooperative counter-terrorism efforts.
Recommendations
There are a great number of challenges ahead of us in the war on
terrorism, and in halting funding for terrorism financing and particularly
for those associated with al Qaeda. However, this writer believes that
there are a number of things that need to be done, or done better, as we
carry out our responsibilities to protect our citizens and our national
interests.
First, we need to focus greater attention on the funding that
supports the propagation of radical Islam – the very foundation that al
Qaeda and like-minded groups use to indoctrinate and recruit new
adherents.
International cooperation in support of the war on terrorism
financing is still patently inadequate. Most cooperation takes place on a
bilateral basis. While the United States has developed some effective
channels for working with other countries, cooperation among third
countries remains quite limited. We need a much better forum for
providing mutual support and for exchanging information related to
terrorism financing.
The United Nations Consolidated List of Designated Individuals and
Entities remains woefully inadequate and out of date. This list provides
the basis for freezing actions in most countries, and for getting them to
halt possible terrorism related transactions. Yet most of the known al
Qaeda world is still not on this UN list. It must either be rapidly
expanded, or replaced by a new formula that requires all countries to take
the appropriate action against those who finance al Qaeda terrorism.
We must also find a better way to use intelligence information in
freezing assets and pursuing criminal prosecutions. Too many known
terrorist financiers continue to remain free to carry out their trades
because of the reticence to share intelligence and other evidentiary
information. Harsh financial and other penalties must be imposed to
deter terrorist funding.
The G-8 has put in place a Counter Terrorism Action Group with a
mandate to identify and assist countries that lack the resources necessary
to combat terrorism financing effectively. The group was also charged
with putting greater pressure on countries that lacked the necessary
political will. This group must take on a much higher profile of activity.
Winning the war on terrorism financing is not impossible. But it is
very difficult. New ideas must be tested and applied to dealing with this
21st century scourge.
