Speakers & Organizers   

www.NewDefenceAgenda.org Biography
Jill Bellamy-Dekker currently serves as bio-defence consultant for New Defence Agenda, an EU-NATO based forum in Brussels. In addition to content development and programme oversight for the Bio-Terrorism Report, she is the Director of the European Group for Non-Proliferation Studies and regularly consults with the pharmaceutical industry, Ministries of Public Health, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defence on issues related to state bio-warfare programmes, threat reduction, and bio-defence. She is a special advisor to strategic affairs with McKenna, Long and Aldridge. With a background in veterinary public health regulation for notification of zoonoses and consequence management for agro and biological terrorism, she currently specializes in legal aspects of strategic vaccine stockpiling for national defence in the European Union. Jill Dekker has advised the European Commission on bio-terrorism and stockpiling for Category A bio-warfare agent counter-measures; resulting in (COM (2004) 701 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Preparedness and consequence management in the fight against terrorism and COM (2004) 698 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks. In addition to publishing on bio-terrorism, orphan drug regulation and bio-warfare agents she is a listed bio-security expert with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD Paris). She is completing work on two Ph.D.’s one at the University of Antwerpen in Belgium and the other at Bar Ilan University in Israel and is fluent Dutch, German and Afrikaans.

---

Session SP15: WMD - Chemical & Biological Weapons
February 18, 15:00 - 15:45 Future Terrorist Weapons:
Could Syrian Acquisitions from the Iraqi Arsenal Increase the Risk of Biological Terrorism?
Abstract:
Beyond dual-use technology sales to rouge states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, this presentation assess how a relatively unsophisticated biological weapons programme might be significantly advanced from the possible acquisition of technology and select pathogens from a third party state. Specifically it examines the potential for Syrian programme advancement and the likely consequences to Israel and her western allies particularly on the notable Hamas victory in Palestine. The presentation is centered on Category A pathogens suitable for warfare and known bio-defence programmes.

Although the concept that only a few select agents pose a plausible threat derived largely from state weapons programmes which predated our current knowledge of molecular biology, the five or so (anthrax, smallpox, botulinum, plague and ricin) select agents remain, in the short term, a formidable threat (Relman, 2006) Anthrax and smallpox make particularly compelling weapons. Rapid advances in the life sciences increase the number of potential agents and technologies for developing future terrorist weapons. The states who sponsor terrorism are conducting advanced research and development on biological weapons. How can such research be obstructed and how should states with a latent biological weapons capability be dealt with?

Today, after the US liberation of Iraq and possible intelligence failures, discussing state weapons programmes can be an unpopular subject particularly in Europe and the mid-east. Unfortunately the threat of bio-terrorism has not in any way been diminished by the lack of reported findings in Iraq or the lack of reported weapons transfers to Syria and Lebanon. In fact the possibility of such transfers if they have occurred would likely advance Syrian programmes considerably. This presentation develops a number of critical criteria for assessing breakout potential of a state, the sponsoring of terrorism with unconventional weapons, how likely this is to occur and what should be done to prevent state sponsored bio-terrorism in the mid-east.